For <N x i32> type mul, pmuludq will be used for targets without SSE41, which
often introduces many extra pack and unpack instructions in vectorized loop
body because pmuludq generates <N/2 x i64> type value. However when the operands
of <N x i32> mul are extended from smaller size values like i8 and i16, the type
of mul may be shrunk to use pmullw + pmulhw/pmulhuw instead of pmuludq, which
generates better code. For targets with SSE41, pmulld is supported so no
shrinking is needed.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20931
llvm-svn: 272694
Summary:
The "-Werror=enum-compare" shows that the statement is using two different enums:
enumeral mismatch in conditional expression: 'llvm::X86ISD::NodeType' vs 'llvm::ISD::NodeType'
A follow-up fix on D21235.
Reviewers: klimek
Subscribers: spatel, cfe-commits
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D21278
llvm-svn: 272539
This used to be free, copying and moving DebugLocs became expensive
after the metadata rewrite. Passing by reference eliminates a ton of
track/untrack operations. No functionality change intended.
llvm-svn: 272512
This patch is intended to solve:
https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=28044
By changing the definition of X86ISD::CMPP to use float types, we allow it to be created
and pass legalization for an SSE1-only target where v4i32 is not legal.
The motivational trail for this change includes:
https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=28001
and eventually makes this trigger:
http://reviews.llvm.org/D21190
Ie, after this step, we should be free to have Clang generate FP compare IR instead of x86
intrinsics for SSE C packed compare intrinsics. (We can auto-upgrade and remove the LLVM
sse.cmp intrinsics as a follow-up step.) Once we're generating vector IR instead of x86
intrinsics, a big pile of generic optimizations can trigger.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D21235
llvm-svn: 272511
PSHUFB can speed up BITREVERSE of byte vectors by performing LUT on the low/high nibbles separately and ORing the results. Wider integer vector types are already BSWAP'd beforehand so also make use of this approach.
llvm-svn: 272477
These are byte shift instructions and it will make shuffle combining a lot more straightforward if we can assume a vXi8 vector of bytes so decoded shuffle masks match the return type's number of elements
llvm-svn: 272468
512-bit VPSLLDQ/VPSRLDQ can only be used for avx512bw targets so lowerVectorShuffleAsShift had to be adjusted to include the subtarget
llvm-svn: 272300
As suggested by clang-tidy's performance-unnecessary-copy-initialization.
This can easily hit lifetime issues, so I audited every change and ran the
tests under asan, which came back clean.
llvm-svn: 272126
Summary:
This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation
The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch.
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx
* To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347
Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation:
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx
* http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/
* http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html
For the following example:
```
int example(int offset, int index) {
char buffer[10];
memset(buffer, 0xCC, index);
return buffer[index];
}
```
The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check:
```
push ebp
mov ebp,esp
sub esp,50h
[1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)]
[2] xor eax,ebp
[3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
push eax
push 0CCh
lea ecx,[buffer]
push ecx
call _memset (010610B9h)
add esp,0Ch
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax]
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
[4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4]
[5] xor ecx,ebp
[6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h)
mov esp,ebp
pop ebp
ret
```
The instrumentation above is:
* [1] is loading the global security canary,
* [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot,
* [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary,
* [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling.
Overview of the current stack-protection implementation:
* lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp
* There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation.
* The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie.
* An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast).
* Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling.
* Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation.
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp
* There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls).
* see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration.
* The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr).
* 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie)
* The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'.
* include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h
* Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'.
* lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp
* Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm.
Function-based Instrumentation:
* The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions.
* To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is
* adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h),
* If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue.
* modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation,
* generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp),
* if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp).
Modifications
* adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp)
* adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h)
Results
* IR generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input
```
```
*** Final LLVM Code input to ISel ***
; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong
define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 {
entry:
%StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot
%0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot)
%index.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1
store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4
store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4
%arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0
%1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false)
%2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2
%3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1
%conv = sext i8 %3 to i32
%4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot
call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
ret i32 %conv
}
```
* SelectionDAG generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA
```
```
"?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"
# BB#0: # %entry
pushl %esi
subl $16, %esp
movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
movl 28(%esp), %esi
movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot
leal 2(%esp), %eax
pushl %esi
pushl $204
pushl %eax
calll _memset
addl $12, %esp
movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi
movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot
calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
movl %esi, %eax
addl $16, %esp
popl %esi
retl
```
Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk
Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346
llvm-svn: 272053
We currently only combine to blend+zero if the target value type has 8 elements or less, but this was missing a lot of cases where the combined mask had been widened.
This change makes it so we use the combined mask to determine the blend value type, allowing us to catch more widened cases.
llvm-svn: 272003
Windows itanium is nearly identical to windows-msvc (MS ABI for C, itanium for
C++). Enable the TLS support for the target similar to the MSVC model.
llvm-svn: 271797
The AVX2 v16i16 shift lowering works by unpacking to 2 x v8i32, performing the shift and then truncating the result.
The unpacking is used to place the values in the upper 16-bits so that we can correctly sign-extend for SRA shifts. Unfortunately we weren't ensuring that the lower 16-bits were zero to ensure that SHL correctly shifts in zero bits.
llvm-svn: 271796
This patch begins adding support for lowering to the XOP VPERMIL2PD/VPERMIL2PS shuffle instructions - adding the X86ISD::VPERMIL2 opcode and cleaning up the usage.
The internal llvm intrinsics were assuming the shuffle mask operand was the same type as the float/double input operands (I guess to simplify the intrinsic definitions in X86InstrXOP.td to a single value type). These needed changing to integer types (matching the clang builtin and the AMD intrinsics definitions), an auto upgrade path is added to convert old calls.
Mask decoding/target shuffle support will be added in future patches.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20049
llvm-svn: 271633
Summary:
In PR29973 Sanjay Patel reported an assertion failure when a certain
loop was optimized, for a target without SSE2 support. It turned out
this was because of the AVG pattern detection introduced in rL253952.
Prevent the assertion failure by bailing out early in
`detectAVGPattern()`, if the target does not support SSE2.
Also add a minimized test case.
Reviewers: congh, eli.friedman, spatel
Subscribers: emaste, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20905
llvm-svn: 271548
Introduced in r271244, this is probably undefined behaviour and asserts when
compiled with Visual C++ debug mode.
On further note, the loop is quadratic with regard to the number of successors
since removeSuccessor is linear and could probably be modified to linear time.
llvm-svn: 271278
This adds support to the backed to actually support SjLj EH as an exception
model. This is *NOT* the default model, and requires explicitly opting into it
from the frontend. GCC supports this model and for MinGW can still be enabled
via the `--using-sjlj-exceptions` options.
Addresses PR27749!
llvm-svn: 271244
Most often as not this is what it started out as, the extraction is zero-cost on AVX and the PMOVZX/PMOVSX folding logic is based around 128-bit loads.
llvm-svn: 270858
Craig Topper