subtarget features for indirect calls and indirect branches.
This is in preparation for enabling *only* the call retpolines when
using speculative load hardening.
I've continued to use subtarget features for now as they continue to
seem the best fit given the lack of other retpoline like constructs so
far.
The LLVM side is pretty simple. I'd like to eventually get rid of the
old feature, but not sure what backwards compatibility issues that will
cause.
This does remove the "implies" from requesting an external thunk. This
always seemed somewhat questionable and is now clearly not desirable --
you specify a thunk the same way no matter which set of things are
getting retpolines.
I really want to keep this nicely isolated from end users and just an
LLVM implementation detail, so I've moved the `-mretpoline` flag in
Clang to no longer rely on a specific subtarget feature by that name and
instead to be directly handled. In some ways this is simpler, but in
order to preserve existing behavior I've had to add some fallback code
so that users who relied on merely passing -mretpoline-external-thunk
continue to get the same behavior. We should eventually remove this
I suspect (we have never tested that it works!) but I've not done that
in this patch.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D51150
llvm-svn: 340515
Summary:
So far, `isReturn` property is used to mean both a return instruction
from a functon and the end of an EH scope, a scope that starts with a EH
scope entry BB and ends with a catchret or a cleanupret instruction.
Because WinEH uses funclets, all EH-scope-ending instructions are also
real return instruction from a function. But for wasm, they only serve
as the end marker of an EH scope but not a return instruction that
exits a function. This mismatch caused incorrect prolog and epilog
generation in wasm EH scopes. This patch fixes this.
This patch is in the same vein with rL333045, which splits
`MachineBasicBlock::isEHFuncletEntry` into `isEHFuncletEntry` and
`isEHScopeEntry`.
Reviewers: dschuff
Subscribers: sbc100, jgravelle-google, sunfish, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D50653
llvm-svn: 340325
Now we switch to the subregister in expandPostRAPseudos where we already switched the opcode.
This simplifies a few isel patterns that used the pseudo directly. And magically seems to have improved our ability to CSE it in the undef-label.ll test.
llvm-svn: 339496
If the store is volatile this might be a memory mapped IO access. In that case we shouldn't generate a load that didn't exist in the source
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D50270
llvm-svn: 339041
At one point in time acquire implied mayLoad and mayStore as did release. Thus we needed separate pseudos that also carried that property. This appears to no longer be the case. I believe it was changed in 2012 with a comment saying that atomic memory accesses are marked volatile which preserves the ordering.
So from what I can tell we shouldn't need additional pseudos since they aren't carry any flags that are different from the normal instructions. The only thing I can think of is that we may consider them for load folding candidates in the peephole pass now where we didn't before. If that's important hopefully there's something in the memory operand we can check to prevent the folding without relying on pseudo instructions.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D50212
llvm-svn: 338925
Don't try to generate large PIC code for non-ELF targets. Neither COFF
nor MachO have relocations for large position independent code, and
users have been using "large PIC" code models to JIT 64-bit code for a
while now. With this change, if they are generating ELF code, their
JITed code will truly be PIC, but if they target MachO or COFF, it will
contain 64-bit immediates that directly reference external symbols. For
a JIT, that's perfectly fine.
llvm-svn: 337740
This unfortunately requires a bunch of bitcasts to be added added to SUBREG_TO_REG, COPY_TO_REGCLASS, and instructions in output patterns. Otherwise tablegen seems to default to picking f128 and then we fail when something tries to get the register class for f128 which isn't always valid.
The test changes are because we were previously mixing fr128 and vr128 due to contrainRegClass finding FR128 first and passes like live range shrinking weren't handling that well.
llvm-svn: 337147
Reverting because this is causing failures in the LLDB test suite on
GreenDragon.
LLVM ERROR: unsupported relocation with subtraction expression, symbol
'__GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_' can not be undefined in a subtraction
expression
llvm-svn: 335894
BMI2 added new shift by register instructions that have the ability to fold a load.
Normally without doing anything special isel would prefer folding a load over folding an immediate because the load folding pattern has higher "complexity". This would require an instruction to move the immediate into a register. We would rather fold the immediate instead and have a separate instruction for the load.
We used to enforce this priority by artificially lowering the complexity of the load pattern.
This patch changes this to instead reject the load fold in isProfitableToFoldLoad if there is an immediate. This is more consistent with other binops and feels less hacky.
llvm-svn: 335804
If we are just modifying a single bit at a variable bit position we can use the BT* instructions to make the change instead of shifting a 1(or rotating a -1) and doing a binop. These instruction also ignore the upper bits of their index input so we can also remove an and if one is present on the index.
Fixes PR37938.
llvm-svn: 335754
Summary:
Same idea as D48529, but restricted to X86 and done very late to avoid any surprises where subtract might be better for DAG combining.
This seems like the safest way to do this trick. And we consider doing it as a DAG combine later.
Reviewers: spatel, RKSimon
Reviewed By: spatel
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D48557
llvm-svn: 335575
The large code model allows code and data segments to exceed 2GB, which
means that some symbol references may require a displacement that cannot
be encoded as a displacement from RIP. The large PIC model even relaxes
the assumption that the GOT itself is within 2GB of all code. Therefore,
we need a special code sequence to materialize it:
.LtmpN:
leaq .LtmpN(%rip), %rbx
movabsq $_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_-.LtmpN, %rax # Scratch
addq %rax, %rbx # GOT base reg
From that, non-local references go through the GOT base register instead
of being PC-relative loads. Local references typically use GOTOFF
symbols, like this:
movq extern_gv@GOT(%rbx), %rax
movq local_gv@GOTOFF(%rbx), %rax
All calls end up being indirect:
movabsq $local_fn@GOTOFF, %rax
addq %rbx, %rax
callq *%rax
The medium code model retains the assumption that the code segment is
less than 2GB, so calls are once again direct, and the RIP-relative
loads can be used to access the GOT. Materializing the GOT is easy:
leaq _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_(%rip), %rbx # GOT base reg
DSO local data accesses will use it:
movq local_gv@GOTOFF(%rbx), %rax
Non-local data accesses will use RIP-relative addressing, which means we
may not always need to materialize the GOT base:
movq extern_gv@GOTPCREL(%rip), %rax
Direct calls are basically the same as they are in the small code model:
They use direct, PC-relative addressing, and the PLT is used for calls
to non-local functions.
This patch adds reasonably comprehensive testing of LEA, but there are
lots of interesting folding opportunities that are unimplemented.
I restricted the MCJIT/eh-lg-pic.ll test to Linux, since the large PIC
code model is not implemented for MachO yet.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D47211
llvm-svn: 335508
For some reason the 64-bit patterns were separated from their 8/16/32-bit friends, but only for add/sub/mul. For and/or/xor they were together.
llvm-svn: 335429
Summary:
The large code model allows code and data segments to exceed 2GB, which
means that some symbol references may require a displacement that cannot
be encoded as a displacement from RIP. The large PIC model even relaxes
the assumption that the GOT itself is within 2GB of all code. Therefore,
we need a special code sequence to materialize it:
.LtmpN:
leaq .LtmpN(%rip), %rbx
movabsq $_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_-.LtmpN, %rax # Scratch
addq %rax, %rbx # GOT base reg
From that, non-local references go through the GOT base register instead
of being PC-relative loads. Local references typically use GOTOFF
symbols, like this:
movq extern_gv@GOT(%rbx), %rax
movq local_gv@GOTOFF(%rbx), %rax
All calls end up being indirect:
movabsq $local_fn@GOTOFF, %rax
addq %rbx, %rax
callq *%rax
The medium code model retains the assumption that the code segment is
less than 2GB, so calls are once again direct, and the RIP-relative
loads can be used to access the GOT. Materializing the GOT is easy:
leaq _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_(%rip), %rbx # GOT base reg
DSO local data accesses will use it:
movq local_gv@GOTOFF(%rbx), %rax
Non-local data accesses will use RIP-relative addressing, which means we
may not always need to materialize the GOT base:
movq extern_gv@GOTPCREL(%rip), %rax
Direct calls are basically the same as they are in the small code model:
They use direct, PC-relative addressing, and the PLT is used for calls
to non-local functions.
This patch adds reasonably comprehensive testing of LEA, but there are
lots of interesting folding opportunities that are unimplemented.
Reviewers: chandlerc, echristo
Subscribers: hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D47211
llvm-svn: 335297
Only the bottom 16-bits of BEXTR's control op are required (0:8 INDEX, 15:8 LENGTH).
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D47690
llvm-svn: 334083
This cleans up a number of operations that only claimed te use EFLAGS
due to using DF. But no instructions which we think of us setting EFLAGS
actually modify DF (other than things like popf) and so this needlessly
creates uses of EFLAGS that aren't really there.
In fact, DF is so restrictive it is pretty easy to model. Only STD, CLD,
and the whole-flags writes (WRFLAGS and POPF) need to model this.
I've also somewhat cleaned up some of the flag management instruction
definitions to be in the correct .td file.
Adding this extra register also uncovered a failure to use the correct
datatype to hold X86 registers, and I've corrected that as necessary
here.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45154
llvm-svn: 329673
We can't fold a large immediate into a 64-bit operation. But if we know we're only operating on a single bit we can use the bit instructions.
For now only do this for optsize.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D37418
llvm-svn: 325287
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
Summary:
This patch adds an implementation of targetShrinkDemandedConstant that tries to keep shrinkdemandedbits from removing bits that would otherwise have been recognized as a movzx.
We still need a follow patch to stop moving ands across srl if the and could be represented as a movzx before the shift but not after. I think this should help with some of the cases that D42088 ended up removing during isel.
Reviewers: spatel, RKSimon
Reviewed By: spatel
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42265
llvm-svn: 323048
The patch originally broke Chromium (crbug.com/791714) due to its failing to
specify that the new pseudo instructions clobber EFLAGS. This commit fixes
that.
> Summary: This strengthens the guard and matches MSVC.
>
> Reviewers: hans, etienneb
>
> Subscribers: hiraditya, JDevlieghere, vlad.tsyrklevich, llvm-commits
>
> Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40622
llvm-svn: 319824
Shadow stack solution introduces a new stack for return addresses only.
The HW has a Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP) that points to the next return address.
If we return to a different address, an exception is triggered.
The shadow stack is managed using a series of intrinsics that are introduced in this patch as well as the new register (SSP).
The intrinsics are mapped to new instruction set that implements CET mechanism.
The patch also includes initial infrastructure support for IBT.
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40223
Change-Id: I4daa1f27e88176be79a4ac3b4cd26a459e88fed4
llvm-svn: 318996
Summary:
INC/DEC don't update the carry flag so we need to make sure we don't try to use it.
This patch introduces new X86ISD opcodes for locked INC/DEC. Teaches lowerAtomicArithWithLOCK to emit these nodes if INC/DEC is not slow or the function is being optimized for size. An additional flag is added that allows the INC/DEC to be disabled if the caller determines that the carry flag is being requested.
The test_sub_1_cmp_1_setcc_ugt test is currently showing this bug. The other test case changes are recovering cases that were regressed in r316860.
This should fully fix PR35068 finishing the fix started in r316860.
Reviewers: RKSimon, zvi, spatel
Reviewed By: zvi
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D39411
llvm-svn: 316913
Chandler Carruth