commit dfd2ee086a upstream.
Both addrconf_verify_work() and addrconf_dad_work() acquire rtnl,
there is no point trying to have one thread per cpu.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201173031.3654257-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4cb17b11c8af2fa9de840ffe7fc0bb712f894242)
[ Upstream commit e9c0b96ec0a34fcacdf9365713578d83cecac34c ]
Under some circumstances, such as when a server socket is closing, ABORT
packets will be generated in response to incoming packets. Unfortunately,
this also may include generating aborts in response to incoming aborts -
which may cause a cycle. It appears this may be made possible by giving
the client a multicast address.
Fix this such that rxrpc_reject_packet() will refuse to generate aborts in
response to aborts.
Fixes: 248f219cb8 ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
cc: LePremierHomme <kwqcheii@proton.me>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250717074350.3767366-5-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 74bb4de32d92e9eda56680bc720edc662d416269)
[ Upstream commit 962fb1f651c2cf2083e0c3ef53ba69e3b96d3fbc ]
If a call receives an event (such as incoming data), the call gets placed
on the socket's queue and a thread in recvmsg can be awakened to go and
process it. Once the thread has picked up the call off of the queue,
further events will cause it to be requeued, and once the socket lock is
dropped (recvmsg uses call->user_mutex to allow the socket to be used in
parallel), a second thread can come in and its recvmsg can pop the call off
the socket queue again.
In such a case, the first thread will be receiving stuff from the call and
the second thread will be blocked on call->user_mutex. The first thread
can, at this point, process both the event that it picked call for and the
event that the second thread picked the call for and may see the call
terminate - in which case the call will be "released", decoupling the call
from the user call ID assigned to it (RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID in the control
message).
The first thread will return okay, but then the second thread will wake up
holding the user_mutex and, if it sees that the call has been released by
the first thread, it will BUG thusly:
kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:474!
Fix this by just dequeuing the call and ignoring it if it is seen to be
already released. We can't tell userspace about it anyway as the user call
ID has become stale.
Fixes: 248f219cb8 ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code")
Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: LePremierHomme <kwqcheii@proton.me>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250717074350.3767366-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7692bde890061797f3dece0148d7859e85c55778)
[ Upstream commit 0e1d5d9b5c5966e2e42e298670808590db5ed628 ]
htb_lookup_leaf has a BUG_ON that can trigger with the following:
tc qdisc del dev lo root
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: htb default 1
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 htb rate 64bit
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: netem
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 2:1 handle 3: blackhole
ping -I lo -c1 -W0.001 127.0.0.1
The root cause is the following:
1. htb_dequeue calls htb_dequeue_tree which calls the dequeue handler on
the selected leaf qdisc
2. netem_dequeue calls enqueue on the child qdisc
3. blackhole_enqueue drops the packet and returns a value that is not
just NET_XMIT_SUCCESS
4. Because of this, netem_dequeue calls qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog, and
since qlen is now 0, it calls htb_qlen_notify -> htb_deactivate ->
htb_deactiviate_prios -> htb_remove_class_from_row -> htb_safe_rb_erase
5. As this is the only class in the selected hprio rbtree,
__rb_change_child in __rb_erase_augmented sets the rb_root pointer to
NULL
6. Because blackhole_dequeue returns NULL, netem_dequeue returns NULL,
which causes htb_dequeue_tree to call htb_lookup_leaf with the same
hprio rbtree, and fail the BUG_ON
The function graph for this scenario is shown here:
0) | htb_enqueue() {
0) + 13.635 us | netem_enqueue();
0) 4.719 us | htb_activate_prios();
0) # 2249.199 us | }
0) | htb_dequeue() {
0) 2.355 us | htb_lookup_leaf();
0) | netem_dequeue() {
0) + 11.061 us | blackhole_enqueue();
0) | qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() {
0) | qdisc_lookup_rcu() {
0) 1.873 us | qdisc_match_from_root();
0) 6.292 us | }
0) 1.894 us | htb_search();
0) | htb_qlen_notify() {
0) 2.655 us | htb_deactivate_prios();
0) 6.933 us | }
0) + 25.227 us | }
0) 1.983 us | blackhole_dequeue();
0) + 86.553 us | }
0) # 2932.761 us | qdisc_warn_nonwc();
0) | htb_lookup_leaf() {
0) | BUG_ON();
------------------------------------------
The full original bug report can be seen here [1].
We can fix this just by returning NULL instead of the BUG_ON,
as htb_dequeue_tree returns NULL when htb_lookup_leaf returns
NULL.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/pF5XOOIim0IuEfhI-SOxTgRvNoDwuux7UHKnE_Y5-zVd4wmGvNk2ceHjKb8ORnzw0cGwfmVu42g9dL7XyJLf1NEzaztboTWcm0Ogxuojoeo=@willsroot.io/
Fixes: 512bb43eb5 ("pkt_sched: sch_htb: Optimize WARN_ONs in htb_dequeue_tree() etc.")
Signed-off-by: William Liu <will@willsroot.io>
Signed-off-by: Savino Dicanosa <savy@syst3mfailure.io>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250717022816.221364-1-will@willsroot.io
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7ff2d83ecf2619060f30ecf9fad4f2a700fca344)
[ Upstream commit 683dc24da8bf199bb7446e445ad7f801c79a550e ]
Do not offload IGMP/MLD messages as it could lead to IGMP/MLD Reports
being unintentionally flooded to Hosts. Instead, let the bridge decide
where to send these IGMP/MLD messages.
Consider the case where the local host is sending out reports in response
to a remote querier like the following:
mcast-listener-process (IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP)
\
br0
/ \
swp1 swp2
| |
QUERIER SOME-OTHER-HOST
In the above setup, br0 will want to br_forward() reports for
mcast-listener-process's group(s) via swp1 to QUERIER; but since the
source hwdom is 0, the report is eligible for tx offloading, and is
flooded by hardware to both swp1 and swp2, reaching SOME-OTHER-HOST as
well. (Example and illustration provided by Tobias.)
Fixes: 472111920f ("net: bridge: switchdev: allow the TX data plane forwarding to be offloaded")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Huang <Joseph.Huang@garmin.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250716153551.1830255-1-Joseph.Huang@garmin.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b0d42318393186f218b8a617ff3d0a01693274c)
[ Upstream commit 579d4f9ca9a9a605184a9b162355f6ba131f678d ]
Assuming the "rx-vlan-filter" feature is enabled on a net device, the
8021q module will automatically add or remove VLAN 0 when the net device
is put administratively up or down, respectively. There are a couple of
problems with the above scheme.
The first problem is a memory leak that can happen if the "rx-vlan-filter"
feature is disabled while the device is running:
# ip link add bond1 up type bond mode 0
# ethtool -K bond1 rx-vlan-filter off
# ip link del dev bond1
When the device is put administratively down the "rx-vlan-filter"
feature is disabled, so the 8021q module will not remove VLAN 0 and the
memory will be leaked [1].
Another problem that can happen is that the kernel can automatically
delete VLAN 0 when the device is put administratively down despite not
adding it when the device was put administratively up since during that
time the "rx-vlan-filter" feature was disabled. null-ptr-unref or
bug_on[2] will be triggered by unregister_vlan_dev() for refcount
imbalance if toggling filtering during runtime:
$ ip link add bond0 type bond mode 0
$ ip link add link bond0 name vlan0 type vlan id 0 protocol 802.1q
$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter off
$ ifconfig bond0 up
$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter on
$ ifconfig bond0 down
$ ip link del vlan0
Root cause is as below:
step1: add vlan0 for real_dev, such as bond, team.
register_vlan_dev
vlan_vid_add(real_dev,htons(ETH_P_8021Q),0) //refcnt=1
step2: disable vlan filter feature and enable real_dev
step3: change filter from 0 to 1
vlan_device_event
vlan_filter_push_vids
ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid //No refcnt added to real_dev vlan0
step4: real_dev down
vlan_device_event
vlan_vid_del(dev, htons(ETH_P_8021Q), 0); //refcnt=0
vlan_info_rcu_free //free vlan0
step5: delete vlan0
unregister_vlan_dev
BUG_ON(!vlan_info); //vlan_info is null
Fix both problems by noting in the VLAN info whether VLAN 0 was
automatically added upon NETDEV_UP and based on that decide whether it
should be deleted upon NETDEV_DOWN, regardless of the state of the
"rx-vlan-filter" feature.
[1]
unreferenced object 0xffff8880068e3100 (size 256):
comm "ip", pid 384, jiffies 4296130254
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 20 30 0d 80 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . 0.............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 81ce31fa):
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2b5/0x340
vlan_vid_add+0x434/0x940
vlan_device_event.cold+0x75/0xa8
notifier_call_chain+0xca/0x150
__dev_notify_flags+0xe3/0x250
rtnl_configure_link+0x193/0x260
rtnl_newlink_create+0x383/0x8e0
__rtnl_newlink+0x22c/0xa40
rtnl_newlink+0x627/0xb00
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fb/0xb70
netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x350
netlink_unicast+0x426/0x710
netlink_sendmsg+0x75a/0xc20
__sock_sendmsg+0xc1/0x150
____sys_sendmsg+0x5aa/0x7b0
___sys_sendmsg+0xfc/0x180
[2]
kernel BUG at net/8021q/vlan.c:99!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 382 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #61 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:unregister_vlan_dev (net/8021q/vlan.c:99 (discriminator 1))
RSP: 0018:ffff88810badf310 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810da84000 RCX: ffffffffb47ceb9a
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88810e8b43c8
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff6cefe80
R10: ffffffffb677f407 R11: ffff88810badf3c0 R12: ffff88810e8b4000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810642a5c0 R15: 000000000000017e
FS: 00007f1ff68c20c0(0000) GS:ffff888163a24000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1ff5dad240 CR3: 0000000107e56000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtnl_dellink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3511 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3553)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6945)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2535)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712 net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:2566)
___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2622)
__sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
Fixes: ad1afb0039 ("vlan_dev: VLAN 0 should be treated as "no vlan tag" (802.1p packet)")
Reported-by: syzbot+a8b046e462915c65b10b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a8b046e462915c65b10b
Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250716034504.2285203-2-dongchenchen2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb515c41306454937464da055609b5fb0a27821b)
[ Upstream commit 4ab26bce3969f8fd925fe6f6f551e4d1a508c68b ]
After recent changes in net-next TCP compacts skbs much more
aggressively. This unearthed a bug in TLS where we may try
to operate on an old skb when checking if all skbs in the
queue have matching decrypt state and geometry.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls]
(net/tls/tls_strp.c:436 net/tls/tls_strp.c:530 net/tls/tls_strp.c:544)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888013085750 by task tls/13529
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13529 Comm: tls Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-virtme
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls]
tls_rx_rec_wait+0x2c9/0x8d0 [tls]
tls_sw_recvmsg+0x40f/0x1aa0 [tls]
inet_recvmsg+0x1c3/0x1f0
Always reload the queue, fast path is to have the record in the queue
when we wake, anyway (IOW the path going down "if !strp->stm.full_len").
Fixes: 0d87bbd39d ("tls: strp: make sure the TCP skbs do not have overlapping data")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250716143850.1520292-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1f3a429c21e0e43e8b8c55d30701e91411a4df02)
[ Upstream commit d24e4a7fedae121d33fb32ad785b87046527eedb ]
Configuration request only configure the incoming direction of the peer
initiating the request, so using the MTU is the other direction shall
not be used, that said the spec allows the peer responding to adjust:
Bluetooth Core 6.1, Vol 3, Part A, Section 4.5
'Each configuration parameter value (if any is present) in an
L2CAP_CONFIGURATION_RSP packet reflects an ‘adjustment’ to a
configuration parameter value that has been sent (or, in case of
default values, implied) in the corresponding
L2CAP_CONFIGURATION_REQ packet.'
That said adjusting the MTU in the response shall be limited to ERTM
channels only as for older modes the remote stack may not be able to
detect the adjustment causing it to silently drop packets.
Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1422
Link: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/issues/149
Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pipewire/pipewire/-/issues/4793
Fixes: 042bb9603c44 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix L2CAP MTU negotiation")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit bd3051a816211fb3e721fe88169a7ce0d7e11c14)
[ Upstream commit 2d72afb340657f03f7261e9243b44457a9228ac7 ]
A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack
entry from the hash bucket list:
[exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172]
[..]
#7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack]
#8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack]
#9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack]
[..]
The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in
a partially initialised state:
ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value
(hence crash).
ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected
ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected.
Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore
ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly
allocated but not yet inserted into the hash:
- ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash
- ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow
rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value.
If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED,
__nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry.
Theory is that we did hit following race:
cpu x cpu y cpu z
found entry E found entry E
E is expired <preemption>
nf_ct_delete()
return E to rcu slab
init_conntrack
E is re-inited,
ct->status set to 0
reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev
stores hash value.
cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x.
E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before
checking for expiry and/or confirm bit.
->refcnt set to 1
E now owned by skb
->timeout set to 30000
If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as
expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit.
nf_conntrack_confirm gets called
sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED
This is wrong: E is not yet added
to hashtable.
cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED:
<resumes>
nf_ct_expired()
-> yes (ct->timeout is 30s)
confirmed bit set.
cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable:
nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit
__nf_ct_delete_from_lists
Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash:
cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks:
wait for spinlock held by z
CONFIRMED is set but there is no
guarantee ct will be added to hash:
"chaintoolong" or "clash resolution"
logic both skip the insert step.
reply hnnode.pprev still stores the
hash value.
unlocks spinlock
return NF_DROP
<unblocks, then
crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev>
In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink
E again right away but no crash occurs.
Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence:
ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets
destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy.
To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table
insertion but before the unlock.
Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen
before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and
before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this.
It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right
before the CONFIRMED bit was set:
Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation"
case: the entry will be skipped.
Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit.
The gc sequence is:
1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry
2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1.
nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an
expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes
ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date
instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry.
Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence:
1. Check if entry has expired.
2. Obtain a reference.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1:
4 - entry is still observed as expired
5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU
and confirm bit gets set
6 - confirm bit is seen
7 - valid entry is removed again
First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either
confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for
re-inited conntrack objects.
This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without
commit 8a75a2c174 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list")
|= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes.
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <rzvncj@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20250627142758.25664-1-fw@strlen.de/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/4239da15-83ff-4ca4-939d-faef283471bb@gmail.com/
Fixes: 1397af5bfd ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 76179961c423cd698080b5e4d5583cf7f4fcdde9)
[ Upstream commit ae3264a25a4635531264728859dbe9c659fad554 ]
pmc->idev is still used in ip6_mc_clear_src(), so as mld_clear_delrec()
does, the reference should be put after ip6_mc_clear_src() return.
Fixes: 63ed8de4be ("mld: add mc_lock for protecting per-interface mld data")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250714141957.3301871-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit dcbc346f50a009d8b7f4e330f9f2e22d6442fa26)
[ Upstream commit 6ef99c917688a8510259e565bd1b168b7146295a ]
This replaces the usage of HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM, which as the name
suggest is to indicate a regular disconnection initiated by an user,
with HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE to indicate the session has timeout thus any
pairing shall be considered as failed.
Fixes: 1e91c29eb6 ("Bluetooth: Use hci_disconnect for immediate disconnection from SMP")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ceefc9c31e74204d0d795b1f26d03c0124ee83d)
[ Upstream commit fe4840df0bdf341f376885271b7680764fe6b34e ]
If a command is received while a bonding is ongoing consider it a
pairing failure so the session is cleanup properly and the device is
disconnected immediately instead of continuing with other commands that
may result in the session to get stuck without ever completing such as
the case bellow:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 2048 flags 0x02 dlen 21
SMP: Identity Information (0x08) len 16
Identity resolving key[16]: d7e08edef97d3e62cd2331f82d8073b0
> ACL Data RX: Handle 2048 flags 0x02 dlen 21
SMP: Signing Information (0x0a) len 16
Signature key[16]: 1716c536f94e843a9aea8b13ffde477d
Bluetooth: hci0: unexpected SMP command 0x0a from XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX
> ACL Data RX: Handle 2048 flags 0x02 dlen 12
SMP: Identity Address Information (0x09) len 7
Address: XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX (Intel Corporate)
While accourding to core spec 6.1 the expected order is always BD_ADDR
first first then CSRK:
When using LE legacy pairing, the keys shall be distributed in the
following order:
LTK by the Peripheral
EDIV and Rand by the Peripheral
IRK by the Peripheral
BD_ADDR by the Peripheral
CSRK by the Peripheral
LTK by the Central
EDIV and Rand by the Central
IRK by the Central
BD_ADDR by the Central
CSRK by the Central
When using LE Secure Connections, the keys shall be distributed in the
following order:
IRK by the Peripheral
BD_ADDR by the Peripheral
CSRK by the Peripheral
IRK by the Central
BD_ADDR by the Central
CSRK by the Central
According to the Core 6.1 for commands used for key distribution "Key
Rejected" can be used:
'3.6.1. Key distribution and generation
A device may reject a distributed key by sending the Pairing Failed command
with the reason set to "Key Rejected".
Fixes: b28b494366 ("Bluetooth: Add strict checks for allowed SMP PDUs")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit f3323b18e3cc98225e5a4f9083b0b93174240eab)
[ Upstream commit d85edab911a4c1fcbe3f08336eff5c7feec567d0 ]
Currently, the connectable flag used by the setup of an extended
advertising instance drives whether we require privacy when trying to pass
a random address to the advertising parameters (Own Address).
If privacy is not required, then it automatically falls back to using the
controller's public address. This can cause problems when using controllers
that do not have a public address set, but instead use a static random
address.
e.g. Assume a BLE controller that does not have a public address set.
The controller upon powering is set with a random static address by default
by the kernel.
< HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6
Address: E4:AF:26:D8:3E:3A (Static)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
Setting non-connectable extended advertisement parameters in bluetoothctl
mgmt
add-ext-adv-params -r 0x801 -x 0x802 -P 2M -g 1
correctly sets Own address type as Random
< HCI Command: LE Set Extended Advertising Parameters (0x08|0x0036)
plen 25
...
Own address type: Random (0x01)
Setting connectable extended advertisement parameters in bluetoothctl mgmt
add-ext-adv-params -r 0x801 -x 0x802 -P 2M -g -c 1
mistakenly sets Own address type to Public (which causes to use Public
Address 00:00:00:00:00:00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Extended Advertising Parameters (0x08|0x0036)
plen 25
...
Own address type: Public (0x00)
This causes either the controller to emit an Invalid Parameters error or to
mishandle the advertising.
This patch makes sure that we use the already set static random address
when requesting a connectable extended advertising when we don't require
privacy and our public address is not set (00:00:00:00:00:00).
Fixes: 3fe318ee72 ("Bluetooth: move hci_get_random_address() to hci_sync")
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Gasbarroni <alex.gasbarroni@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 32e624912eed5f87bfe5094e78fe532269b0a451)
[ Upstream commit 5e28d5a3f774f118896aec17a3a20a9c5c9dfc64 ]
A race condition can occur when 'agg' is modified in qfq_change_agg
(called during qfq_enqueue) while other threads access it
concurrently. For example, qfq_dump_class may trigger a NULL
dereference, and qfq_delete_class may cause a use-after-free.
This patch addresses the issue by:
1. Moved qfq_destroy_class into the critical section.
2. Added sch_tree_lock protection to qfq_dump_class and
qfq_dump_class_stats.
Fixes: 462dbc9101 ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost")
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit fbe48f06e64134dfeafa89ad23387f66ebca3527)
commit 55f0bfc0370539213202f4ce1a07615327ac4713 upstream.
When MSG_DONTWAIT is not set, the tpacket_snd operation will wait for
pending_refcnt to decrement to zero before returning. The pending_refcnt
is decremented by 1 when the skb->destructor function is called,
indicating that the skb has been successfully sent and needs to be
destroyed.
If an error occurs during this process, the tpacket_snd() function will
exit and return error, but pending_refcnt may not yet have decremented to
zero. Assuming the next send operation is executed immediately, but there
are no available frames to be sent in tx_ring (i.e., packet_current_frame
returns NULL), and skb is also NULL, the function will not execute
wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() to yield the CPU. Instead, it
will enter a do-while loop, waiting for pending_refcnt to be zero. Even
if the previous skb has completed transmission, the skb->destructor
function can only be invoked in the ksoftirqd thread (assuming NAPI
threading is enabled). When both the ksoftirqd thread and the tpacket_snd
operation happen to run on the same CPU, and the CPU trapped in the
do-while loop without yielding, the ksoftirqd thread will not get
scheduled to run. As a result, pending_refcnt will never be reduced to
zero, and the do-while loop cannot exit, eventually leading to a CPU soft
lockup issue.
In fact, skb is true for all but the first iterations of that loop, and
as long as pending_refcnt is not zero, even if incremented by a previous
call, wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() should be executed to
yield the CPU, allowing the ksoftirqd thread to be scheduled. Therefore,
the execution condition of this function should be modified to check if
pending_refcnt is not zero, instead of check skb.
- if (need_wait && skb) {
+ if (need_wait && packet_read_pending(&po->tx_ring)) {
As a result, the judgment conditions are duplicated with the end code of
the while loop, and packet_read_pending() is a very expensive function.
Actually, this loop can only exit when ph is NULL, so the loop condition
can be changed to while (1), and in the "ph = NULL" branch, if the
subsequent condition of if is not met, the loop can break directly. Now,
the loop logic remains the same as origin but is clearer and more obvious.
Fixes: 89ed5b5190 ("af_packet: Block execution of tasks waiting for transmit to complete in AF_PACKET")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: LongJun Tang <tanglongjun@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yun Lu <luyun@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2bae35acbb6ef489c587f61ffa6de41b5eeda8e4)
commit c1ba3c0cbdb5e53a8ec5d708e99cd4c497028a13 upstream.
Due to the changes in commit 581073f626 ("af_packet: do not call
packet_read_pending() from tpacket_destruct_skb()"), every time
tpacket_destruct_skb() is executed, the skb_completion is marked as
completed. When wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns
completed, the pending_refcnt has not yet been reduced to zero.
Therefore, when ph is NULL, the wait function may need to be called
multiple times until packet_read_pending() finally returns zero.
We should call sock_sndtimeo() only once, otherwise the SO_SNDTIMEO
constraint could be way off.
Fixes: 581073f626 ("af_packet: do not call packet_read_pending() from tpacket_destruct_skb()")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yun Lu <luyun@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67ea5f37b203c7bce841ff11b6f9f06c04c12dc5)
commit 17ba793f381eb813596d6de1cc6820bcbda5ed8b upstream.
A new warning in clang [1] points out a place in pep_sock_accept() where
dst is uninitialized then passed as a const pointer to pep_find_pipe():
net/phonet/pep.c:829:37: error: variable 'dst' is uninitialized when passed as a const pointer argument here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized-const-pointer]
829 | newsk = pep_find_pipe(&pn->hlist, &dst, pipe_handle);
| ^~~:
Move the call to pn_skb_get_dst_sockaddr(), which initializes dst, to
before the call to pep_find_pipe(), so that dst is consistently used
initialized throughout the function.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f7ae8d59f6 ("Phonet: allocate sock from accept syscall rather than soft IRQ")
Link: 00dacf8c22 [1]
Closes: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/2101
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250715-net-phonet-fix-uninit-const-pointer-v1-1-8efd1bd188b3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29db3339db0ed3097d4067e222981b08138d774d)
[ Upstream commit 644f9108f3 ]
As discussed in [0], rehash4 could be missed in udp_lib_rehash() when
udp hash4 changes while hash2 doesn't change. This patch fixes this by
moving rehash4 codes out of rehash2 checking, and then rehash2 and
rehash4 are done separately.
By doing this, we no longer need to call rehash4 explicitly in
udp_lib_hash4(), as the rehash callback in __ip4_datagram_connect takes
it. Thus, now udp_lib_hash4() returns directly if the sk is already
hashed.
Note that uhash4 may fail to work under consecutive connect(<dst
address>) calls because rehash() is not called with every connect(). To
overcome this, connect(<AF_UNSPEC>) needs to be called after the next
connect to a new destination.
[0]
https://lore.kernel.org/all/4761e466ab9f7542c68cdc95f248987d127044d2.1733499715.git.pabeni@redhat.com/
Fixes: 78c91ae2c6 ("ipv4/udp: Add 4-tuple hash for connected socket")
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250110010810.107145-1-lulie@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[ Backport from v6.13 ]
Suggested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
[ Upstream commit 51a00be6a0 ]
After the blamed commit below, udp_rehash() is supposed to be called
with both local and remote addresses set.
Currently that is already the case for IPv6 sockets, but for IPv4 the
destination address is updated after rehashing.
Address the issue moving the destination address and port initialization
before rehashing.
Fixes: 1b29a730ef ("ipv6/udp: Add 4-tuple hash for connected socket")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4761e466ab9f7542c68cdc95f248987d127044d2.1733499715.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[ Backport from v6.13-rc3 ]
Suggested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
commit 1b29a730ef upstream.
Implement ipv6 udp hash4 like that in ipv4. The major difference is that
the hash value should be calculated with udp6_ehashfn(). Besides,
ipv4-mapped ipv6 address is handled before hash() and rehash(). Export
udp_ehashfn because now we use it in udpv6 rehash.
Core procedures of hash/unhash/rehash are same as ipv4, and udpv4 and
udpv6 share the same udptable, so some functions in ipv4 hash4 can also
be shared.
Co-developed-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Co-developed-by: Fred Chen <fred.cc@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Fred Chen <fred.cc@alibaba-inc.com>
Co-developed-by: Yubing Qiu <yubing.qiuyubing@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Yubing Qiu <yubing.qiuyubing@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ Backport from v6.13 ]
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
commit 78c91ae2c6 upstream.
Currently, the udp_table has two hash table, the port hash and portaddr
hash. Usually for UDP servers, all sockets have the same local port and
addr, so they are all on the same hash slot within a reuseport group.
In some applications, UDP servers use connect() to manage clients. In
particular, when firstly receiving from an unseen 4 tuple, a new socket
is created and connect()ed to the remote addr:port, and then the fd is
used exclusively by the client.
Once there are connected sks in a reuseport group, udp has to score all
sks in the same hash2 slot to find the best match. This could be
inefficient with a large number of connections, resulting in high
softirq overhead.
To solve the problem, this patch implement 4-tuple hash for connected
udp sockets. During connect(), hash4 slot is updated, as well as a
corresponding counter, hash4_cnt, in hslot2. In __udp4_lib_lookup(),
hslot4 will be searched firstly if the counter is non-zero. Otherwise,
hslot2 is used like before. Note that only connected sockets enter this
hash4 path, while un-connected ones are not affected.
hlist_nulls is used for hash4, because we probably move to another hslot
wrongly when lookup with concurrent rehash. Then we check nulls at the
list end to see if we should restart lookup. Because udp does not use
SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, we don't need to touch sk_refcnt when lookup.
Stress test results (with 1 cpu fully used) are shown below, in pps:
(1) _un-connected_ socket as server
[a] w/o hash4: 1,825176
[b] w/ hash4: 1,831750 (+0.36%)
(2) 500 _connected_ sockets as server
[c] w/o hash4: 290860 (only 16% of [a])
[d] w/ hash4: 1,889658 (+3.1% compared with [b])
With hash4, compute_score is skipped when lookup, so [d] is slightly
better than [b].
Co-developed-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Co-developed-by: Fred Chen <fred.cc@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Fred Chen <fred.cc@alibaba-inc.com>
Co-developed-by: Yubing Qiu <yubing.qiuyubing@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Yubing Qiu <yubing.qiuyubing@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ Backport from v6.13 ]
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
commit dab78a1745 upstream.
Add a new hash list, hash4, in udp table. It will be used to implement
4-tuple hash for connected udp sockets. This patch adds the hlist to
table, and implements helpers and the initialization. 4-tuple hash is
implemented in the following patch.
hash4 uses hlist_nulls to avoid moving wrongly onto another hlist due to
concurrent rehash, because rehash() can happen with lookup().
Co-developed-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Co-developed-by: Fred Chen <fred.cc@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Fred Chen <fred.cc@alibaba-inc.com>
Co-developed-by: Yubing Qiu <yubing.qiuyubing@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Yubing Qiu <yubing.qiuyubing@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ Backport from v6.13 ]
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
commit accdd51dc7 upstream.
Preparing for udp 4-tuple hash (uhash4 for short).
To implement uhash4 without cache line missing when lookup, hslot2 is
used to record the number of hashed sockets in hslot4. Thus adding a new
struct udp_hslot_main with field hash4_cnt, which is used by hash2. The
new struct is used to avoid doubling the size of udp_hslot.
Before uhash4 lookup, firstly checking hash4_cnt to see if there are
hashed sks in hslot4. Because hslot2 is always used in lookup, there is
no cache line miss.
Related helpers are updated, and use the helpers as possible.
uhash4 is implemented in following patches.
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ Backport from v6.13 ]
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
[ Upstream commit 711c80f7d8b163d3ecd463cd96f07230f488e750 ]
When updating an existing route entry in atrtr_create(), the old device
reference was not being released before assigning the new device,
leading to a device refcount leak. Fix this by calling dev_put() to
release the old device reference before holding the new one.
Fixes: c7f905f0f6 ("[ATALK]: Add missing dev_hold() to atrtr_create().")
Signed-off-by: Kito Xu <veritas501@foxmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_E1A26771CDAB389A0396D1681A90A49E5D09@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a17370da6e476d3d275534e9e9cd2d02c57ca46)
commit a215b5723922f8099078478122f02100e489cb80 upstream.
Commit under Fixes tightened up the memory accounting for Netlink
sockets. Looks like the accounting is too strict for some existing
use cases, Marek reported issues with nl80211 / WiFi iw CLI.
To reduce number of iterations Netlink dumps try to allocate
messages based on the size of the buffer passed to previous
recvmsg() calls. If user space uses a larger buffer in recvmsg()
than sk_rcvbuf we will allocate an skb we won't be able to queue.
Make sure we always allow at least one skb to be queued.
Same workaround is already present in netlink_attachskb().
Alternative would be to cap the allocation size to
rcvbuf - rmem_alloc
but as I said, the workaround is already present in other places.
Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/9794af18-4905-46c6-b12c-365ea2f05858@samsung.com
Fixes: ae8f160e7eb2 ("netlink: Fix wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.")
Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250711001121.3649033-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit c31ee1695b6d88042d7bd6b2a77babb70f941451)
commit a3c4a125ec725cefb40047eb05ff9eafd57830b4 upstream.
We need to allow queuing at least one skb even when skb is
larger than sk->sk_rcvbuf.
The cited commit made a mistake while converting a condition
in netlink_broadcast_deliver().
Let's correct the rmem check for the allow-one-skb rule.
Fixes: ae8f160e7eb24 ("netlink: Fix wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250711053208.2965945-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit ce2ac2e46719e948555a9d57594745271c1429f9)
commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream.
This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability
for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in
response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can
be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks.
This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU
by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard
MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if
the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If
equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt.
This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that
uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses
are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e.,
when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs
was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and
12-byte Mesh Address Extension field.
It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh
networks keep being detected and prevented.
Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being
implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the
following IEEE 802.11 presentation:
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdfhttps://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-protection.docx
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd)
commit 4e914ef063de40397e25a025c70d9737a9e45a8c upstream.
Use addrconf_add_dev() instead of ipv6_find_idev() in
addrconf_gre_config() so that we don't just get the inet6_dev, but also
install the default ff00::/8 multicast route.
Before commit 3e6a0243ff ("gre: Fix again IPv6 link-local address
generation."), the multicast route was created at the end of the
function by addrconf_add_mroute(). But this code path is now only taken
in one particular case (gre devices not bound to a local IP address and
in EUI64 mode). For all other cases, the function exits early and
addrconf_add_mroute() is not called anymore.
Using addrconf_add_dev() instead of ipv6_find_idev() in
addrconf_gre_config(), fixes the problem as it will create the default
multicast route for all gre devices. This also brings
addrconf_gre_config() a bit closer to the normal netdevice IPv6
configuration code (addrconf_dev_config()).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3e6a0243ff ("gre: Fix again IPv6 link-local address generation.")
Reported-by: Aiden Yang <ling@moedove.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANR=AhRM7YHHXVxJ4DmrTNMeuEOY87K2mLmo9KMed1JMr20p6g@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Tested-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/027a923dcb550ad115e6d93ee8bb7d310378bd01.1752070620.git.gnault@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ca1db269a8d202c3f97fd53fa7c9ef7f1bb21d6)
commit 880a88f318cf1d2a0f4c0a7ff7b07e2062b434a4 upstream.
If an AF_RXRPC service socket is opened and bound, but calls are
preallocated, then rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call() will oops because the
rxrpc_backlog struct doesn't get allocated until the first preallocation is
made.
Fix this by returning NULL from rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call() if there is no
backlog struct. This will cause the incoming call to be aborted.
Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
Suggested-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: LePremierHomme <kwqcheii@proton.me>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250708211506.2699012-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit efc1b2b7c1a308b60df8f36bc2d7ce16d3999364)
commit 89fb8acc38852116d38d721ad394aad7f2871670 upstream.
Currently, for controllers with extended advertising, the advertising
data is set in the asynchronous response handler for extended
adverstising params. As most advertising settings are performed in a
synchronous context, the (asynchronous) setting of the advertising data
is done too late (after enabling the advertising).
Move setting of adverstising data from asynchronous response handler
into synchronous context to fix ordering of HCI commands.
Signed-off-by: Christian Eggers <ceggers@arri.de>
Fixes: a0fb3726ba ("Bluetooth: Use Set ext adv/scan rsp data if controller supports")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20250626115209.17839-1-ceggers@arri.de/
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
[ This patch deviates from the upstream version because 3 functions in
hci_sync.c (hci_set_ext_adv_data_sync, hci_set_adv_data_sync and
hci_update_adv_data_sync) had to be moved up within the file. The
content of these functions differs between 6.6 and newer kernels. ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit ddc4fe078948c3ca2a8c5808ebb65853be7932b6)
[ Upstream commit 69e4186773c6445b258fb45b6e1df18df831ec45 ]
When userspace is using AF_RXRPC to provide a server, it has to preallocate
incoming calls and assign to them call IDs that will be used to thread
related recvmsg() and sendmsg() together. The preallocated call IDs will
automatically be attached to calls as they come in until the pool is empty.
To the kernel, the call IDs are just arbitrary numbers, but userspace can
use the call ID to hold a pointer to prepared structs. In any case, the
user isn't permitted to create two calls with the same call ID (call IDs
become available again when the call ends) and EBADSLT should result from
sendmsg() if an attempt is made to preallocate a call with an in-use call
ID.
However, the cleanup in the error handling will trigger both assertions in
rxrpc_cleanup_call() because the call isn't marked complete and isn't
marked as having been released.
Fix this by setting the call state in rxrpc_service_prealloc_one() and then
marking it as being released before calling the cleanup function.
Fixes: 00e907127e ("rxrpc: Preallocate peers, conns and calls for incoming service requests")
Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: LePremierHomme <kwqcheii@proton.me>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250708211506.2699012-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 432c5363cd6fe5a928bbc94524d28b05515684dd)
[ Upstream commit 62dba28275a9a3104d4e33595c7b3328d4032d8d ]
ioctl(ATMARP_MKIP) allocates struct clip_vcc and set it to
vcc->user_back.
The code assumes that vcc_destroy_socket() passes NULL skb
to vcc->push() when the socket is close()d, and then clip_push()
frees clip_vcc.
However, ioctl(ATMARPD_CTRL) sets NULL to vcc->push() in
atm_init_atmarp(), resulting in memory leak.
Let's serialise two ioctl() by lock_sock() and check vcc->push()
in atm_init_atmarp() to prevent memleak.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704062416.1613927-3-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1fb9fb5a4b5cec2d56e26525ef8c519de858fa60)
[ Upstream commit 706cc36477139c1616a9b2b96610a8bb520b7119 ]
atmarpd is protected by RTNL since commit f3a0592b37 ("[ATM]: clip
causes unregister hang").
However, it is not enough because to_atmarpd() is called without RTNL,
especially clip_neigh_solicit() / neigh_ops->solicit() is unsleepable.
Also, there is no RTNL dependency around atmarpd.
Let's use a private mutex and RCU to protect access to atmarpd in
to_atmarpd().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704062416.1613927-2-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06935c50cfa3ac57cce80bba67b6d38ec1406e92)
[ Upstream commit 1e7d9df379a04ccd0c2f82f39fbb69d482e864cc ]
Support returning VMADDR_CID_LOCAL in case no other vsock transport is
available.
Fixes: 0e12190578 ("vsock: add local transport support in the vsock core")
Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703-vsock-transports-toctou-v4-3-98f0eb530747@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit d437e8e7dcb9866a68705bdc2d774b8f9fe514d0)
[ Upstream commit 687aa0c5581b8d4aa87fd92973e4ee576b550cdf ]
Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport
from becoming a stale pointer.
This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport();
add a lockdep assert.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600
Call Trace:
vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40
__sys_connect+0xe8/0x100
__x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Fixes: c0cfa2d8a7 ("vsock: add multi-transports support")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703-vsock-transports-toctou-v4-2-98f0eb530747@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d24bb6780282b0255b9929abe5e8f98007e2c6e)
[ Upstream commit d3a5f2871adc0c61c61869f37f3e697d97f03d8c ]
Syzkaller reported a bug [1] where sk->sk_forward_alloc can overflow.
When we send data, if an skb exists at the tail of the write queue, the
kernel will attempt to append the new data to that skb. However, the code
that checks for available space in the skb is flawed:
'''
copy = size_goal - skb->len
'''
The types of the variables involved are:
'''
copy: ssize_t (s64 on 64-bit systems)
size_goal: int
skb->len: unsigned int
'''
Due to C's type promotion rules, the signed size_goal is converted to an
unsigned int to match skb->len before the subtraction. The result is an
unsigned int.
When this unsigned int result is then assigned to the s64 copy variable,
it is zero-extended, preserving its non-negative value. Consequently, copy
is always >= 0.
Assume we are sending 2GB of data and size_goal has been adjusted to a
value smaller than skb->len. The subtraction will result in copy holding a
very large positive integer. In the subsequent logic, this large value is
used to update sk->sk_forward_alloc, which can easily cause it to overflow.
The syzkaller reproducer uses TCP_REPAIR to reliably create this
condition. However, this can also occur in real-world scenarios. The
tcp_bound_to_half_wnd() function can also reduce size_goal to a small
value. This would cause the subsequent tcp_wmem_schedule() to set
sk->sk_forward_alloc to a value close to INT_MAX. Further memory
allocation requests would then cause sk_forward_alloc to wrap around and
become negative.
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=de6565462ab540f50e47
Reported-by: syzbot+de6565462ab540f50e47@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 270a1c3de4 ("tcp: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250707054112.101081-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 81373cd1d72d87c7d844d4454a526b8f53e72d00)
[ Upstream commit 667eeab4999e981c96b447a4df5f20bdf5c26f13 ]
syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref in tipc_conn_close() during netns
dismantle. [0]
tipc_topsrv_stop() iterates tipc_net(net)->topsrv->conn_idr and calls
tipc_conn_close() for each tipc_conn.
The problem is that tipc_conn_close() is called after releasing the
IDR lock.
At the same time, there might be tipc_conn_recv_work() running and it
could call tipc_conn_close() for the same tipc_conn and release its
last ->kref.
Once we release the IDR lock in tipc_topsrv_stop(), there is no
guarantee that the tipc_conn is alive.
Let's hold the ref before releasing the lock and put the ref after
tipc_conn_close() in tipc_topsrv_stop().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_conn_close+0x122/0x140 net/tipc/topsrv.c:165
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888099305a08 by task kworker/u4:3/435
CPU: 0 PID: 435 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.19.204-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1fc/0x2ef lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.cold+0x54/0x219 mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error.cold+0x8a/0x1b9 mm/kasan/report.c:354
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline]
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x88/0x90 mm/kasan/report.c:433
tipc_conn_close+0x122/0x140 net/tipc/topsrv.c:165
tipc_topsrv_stop net/tipc/topsrv.c:701 [inline]
tipc_topsrv_exit_net+0x27b/0x5c0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:722
ops_exit_list+0xa5/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
cleanup_net+0x3b4/0x8b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:553
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Allocated by task 23:
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12f/0x380 mm/slab.c:3625
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline]
tipc_conn_alloc+0x43/0x4f0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:192
tipc_topsrv_accept+0x1b5/0x280 net/tipc/topsrv.c:470
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Freed by task 23:
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline]
kfree+0xcc/0x210 mm/slab.c:3822
tipc_conn_kref_release net/tipc/topsrv.c:150 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
conn_put+0x2cd/0x3a0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:155
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888099305a00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
512-byte region [ffff888099305a00, ffff888099305c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000264c140 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88813bff0940 index:0x0
flags: 0xfff00000000100(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000100 ffffea00028b6b88 ffffea0002cd2b08 ffff88813bff0940
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888099305000 0000000100000006 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888099305900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888099305980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888099305a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888099305a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888099305b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: c5fa7b3cf3 ("tipc: introduce new TIPC server infrastructure")
Reported-by: syzbot+d333febcf8f4bc5f6110@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=27169a847a70550d17be
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250702014350.692213-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit be4b8392da7978294f2f368799d29dd509fb6c4d)
[ Upstream commit ae8f160e7eb24240a2a79fc4c815c6a0d4ee16cc ]
Netlink has this pattern in some places
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf)
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
, which has the same problem fixed by commit 5a465a0da1 ("udp:
Fix multiple wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.").
For example, if we set INT_MAX to SO_RCVBUFFORCE, the condition
is always false as the two operands are of int.
Then, a single socket can eat as many skb as possible until OOM
happens, and we can see multiple wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.
Let's fix it by using atomic_add_return() and comparing the two
variables as unsigned int.
Before:
[root@fedora ~]# ss -f netlink
Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port
-1668710080 0 rtnl:nl_wraparound/293 *
After:
[root@fedora ~]# ss -f netlink
Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port
2147483072 0 rtnl:nl_wraparound/290 *
^
`--- INT_MAX - 576
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1750285100.git.jbaron@akamai.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704054824.1580222-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55baecb9eb90238f60a8350660d6762046ebd3bd)
[ Upstream commit c7349772c268ec3c91d83cbfbbcf63f1bd7c256c ]
Upon receiving HCI_EVT_LE_BIG_SYNC_ESTABLISHED with status 0x00
(success) the corresponding BIS hci_conn state shall be set to
BT_CONNECTED otherwise they will be left with BT_OPEN which is invalid
at that point, also create the debugfs and sysfs entries following the
same logic as the likes of Broadcast Source BIS and CIS connections.
Fixes: f777d88278 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Notify user space about failed bis connections")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit a219fcea8e8eec4fb70773e8f8bbf0706a9f8260)
[ Upstream commit ef9675b0ef030d135413e8638989f3a7d1f3217a ]
As the code comments on hci_setup_ext_adv_instance_sync suggests the
advertising instance needs to be disabled in order to update its
parameters, but it was wrongly checking that !adv->pending.
Fixes: cba6b75871 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Make use of hci_cmd_sync_queue set 2")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 51e082108345870c100cb4e5e21974100bcf7959)
When the noop_qdisc owner isn't initialized, then it will be 0,
so packets will erroneously be regarded as having been subject
to recursion as long as only CPU 0 queues them. For non-SMP,
that's all packets, of course. This causes a change in what's
reported to userspace, normally noop_qdisc would drop packets
silently, but with this change the syscall returns -ENOBUFS if
RECVERR is also set on the socket.
Fix this by initializing the owner field to -1, just like it
would be for dynamically allocated qdiscs by qdisc_alloc().
Fixes: 0f022d32c3 ("net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240607175340.786bfb938803.I493bf8422e36be4454c08880a8d3703cea8e421a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 44180feacc)
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.9-rc5
commit 0f022d32c3
category: bugfix
CVE: CVE-2024-27010
When the mirred action is used on a classful egress qdisc and a packet is
mirrored or redirected to self we hit a qdisc lock deadlock.
See trace below.
[..... other info removed for brevity....]
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] ============================================
[ 82.890906] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 82.890906] 6.8.0-05205-g77fadd89fe2d-dirty #213 Tainted: G W
[ 82.890906] --------------------------------------------
[ 82.890906] ping/418 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] but task is already holding lock:
[ 82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 82.890906] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] CPU0
[ 82.890906] ----
[ 82.890906] lock(&sch->q.lock);
[ 82.890906] lock(&sch->q.lock);
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 82.890906]
[..... other info removed for brevity....]
Example setup (eth0->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth0
Another example(eth0->eth1->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth1
tc qdisc add dev eth1 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth1 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth0
We fix this by adding an owner field (CPU id) to struct Qdisc set after
root qdisc is entered. When the softirq enters it a second time, if the
qdisc owner is the same CPU, the packet is dropped to break the loop.
Reported-by: Mingshuai Ren <renmingshuai@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240314111713.5979-1-renmingshuai@huawei.com/
Fixes: 3bcb846ca4 ("net: get rid of spin_trylock() in net_tx_action()")
Fixes: e578d9c025 ("net: sched: use counter to break reclassify loops")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Tested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415210728.36949-1-victor@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f022d32c3)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.8-rc1
category: bugfix
Continue expanding Daniel's patch by adding new skb drop reasons that
are idiosyncratic to TC.
More specifically:
- SKB_DROP_REASON_TC_COOKIE_ERROR: An error occurred whilst
processing a tc ext cookie.
- SKB_DROP_REASON_TC_CHAIN_NOTFOUND: tc chain lookup failed.
- SKB_DROP_REASON_TC_RECLASSIFY_LOOP: tc exceeded max reclassify loop
iterations
Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 4cf24dc893)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.8-rc1
category: feature
Incrementing on Daniel's patch[1], make tc-related drop reason more
flexible for remaining qdiscs - that is, all qdiscs aside from clsact.
In essence, the drop reason will be set by cls_api and act_api in case
any error occurred in the data path. With that, we can give the user more
detailed information so that they can distinguish between a policy drop
or an error drop.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231009092655.22025-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit b6a3c6066a)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Eric Dumazet