a shorter name ('x86-slh') for the internal flags and pass name.
Without this, you can't use the -stop-after or -stop-before
infrastructure. I seem to have just missed this when originally adding
the pass.
The shorter name solves two problems. First, the flag names were ...
really long and hard to type/manage. Second, the pass name can't be the
exact same as the flag name used to enable this, and there are already
some users of that flag name so I'm avoiding changing it unnecessarily.
llvm-svn: 339836
a helper function with a nice overview comment. NFC.
This is a preperatory refactoring to implementing another component of
mitigation here that was descibed in the design document but hadn't been
implemented yet.
llvm-svn: 338016
code.
This consolidates all our hardening calls, and simplifies the code
a bit. It seems much more clear to handle all of these together.
No functionality changed here.
llvm-svn: 337895
This function actually does two things: it traces the predicate state
through each of the basic blocks in the function (as that isn't directly
handled by the SSA updater) *and* it hardens everything necessary in the
block as it goes. These need to be done together so that we have the
currently active predicate state to use at each point of the hardening.
However, this also made obvious that the flag to disable actual
hardening of loads was flawed -- it also disabled tracing the predicate
state across function calls within the body of each block. So this patch
sinks this debugging flag test to correctly guard just the hardening of
loads.
Unless load hardening was disabled, no functionality should change with
tis patch.
llvm-svn: 337894
against v1.2 BCBS attacks directly.
Attacks using spectre v1.2 (a subset of BCBS) are described in the paper
here:
https://people.csail.mit.edu/vlk/spectre11.pdf
The core idea is to speculatively store over the address in a vtable,
jumptable, or other target of indirect control flow that will be
subsequently loaded. Speculative execution after such a store can
forward the stored value to subsequent loads, and if called or jumped
to, the speculative execution will be steered to this potentially
attacker controlled address.
Up until now, this could be mitigated by enableing retpolines. However,
that is a relatively expensive technique to mitigate this particular
flavor. Especially because in most cases SLH will have already mitigated
this. To fully mitigate this with SLH, we need to do two core things:
1) Unfold loads from calls and jumps, allowing the loads to be post-load
hardened.
2) Force hardening of incoming registers even if we didn't end up
needing to harden the load itself.
The reason we need to do these two things is because hardening calls and
jumps from this particular variant is importantly different from
hardening against leak of secret data. Because the "bad" data here isn't
a secret, but in fact speculatively stored by the attacker, it may be
loaded from any address, regardless of whether it is read-only memory,
mapped memory, or a "hardened" address. The only 100% effective way to
harden these instructions is to harden the their operand itself. But to
the extent possible, we'd like to take advantage of all the other
hardening going on, we just need a fallback in case none of that
happened to cover the particular input to the control transfer
instruction.
For users of SLH, currently they are paing 2% to 6% performance overhead
for retpolines, but this mechanism is expected to be substantially
cheaper. However, it is worth reminding folks that this does not
mitigate all of the things retpolines do -- most notably, variant #2 is
not in *any way* mitigated by this technique. So users of SLH may still
want to enable retpolines, and the implementation is carefuly designed to
gracefully leverage retpolines to avoid the need for further hardening
here when they are enabled.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49663
llvm-svn: 337878
helper and restructure the post-load hardening to use this.
This isn't as trivial as I would have liked because the post-load
hardening used a trick that only works for it where it swapped in
a temporary register to the load rather than replacing anything.
However, there is a simple way to do this without that trick that allows
this to easily reuse a friendly API for hardening a value in a register.
That API will in turn be usable in subsequent patcehs.
This also techincally changes the position at which we insert the subreg
extraction for the predicate state, but that never resulted in an actual
instruction and so tests don't change at all.
llvm-svn: 337825
This code was really nasty, had several bugs in it originally, and
wasn't carrying its weight. While on Zen we have all 4 ports available
for SHRX, on all of the Intel parts with Agner's tables, SHRX can only
execute on 2 ports, giving it 1/2 the throughput of OR.
Worse, all too often this pattern required two SHRX instructions in
a chain, hurting the critical path by a lot.
Even if we end up needing to safe/restore EFLAGS, that is no longer so
bad. We pay for a uop to save the flag, but we very likely get fusion
when it is used by forming a test/jCC pair or something similar. In
practice, I don't expect the SHRX to be a significant savings here, so
I'd like to avoid the complex code required. We can always resurrect
this if/when someone has a specific performance issue addressed by it.
llvm-svn: 337781
a call, and then again as a return.
Also added a comment to try and explain better why we would be doing
what we're doing when hardening the (non-call) returns.
llvm-svn: 337673
This provides an overview of the algorithm used to harden specific
loads. It also brings this our terminology further in line with
hardening rather than checking.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49583
llvm-svn: 337667
remove dead declaration of a call instruction handling helper.
This moves to the 'harden' terminology that I've been trying to settle
on for returns. It also adds a really detailed comment explaining what
all we're trying to accomplish with return instructions and why.
Hopefully this makes it much more clear what exactly is being
"hardened".
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49571
llvm-svn: 337510
changes that are intertwined here:
1) Extracting the tracing of predicate state through the CFG to its own
function.
2) Creating a struct to manage the predicate state used throughout the
pass.
Doing #1 necessitates and motivates the particular approach for #2 as
now the predicate management is spread across different functions
focused on different aspects of it. A number of simplifications then
fell out as a direct consequence.
I went with an Optional to make it more natural to construct the
MachineSSAUpdater object.
This is probably the single largest outstanding refactoring step I have.
Things get a bit more surgical from here. My current goal, beyond
generally making this maintainable long-term, is to implement several
improvements to how we do interprocedural tracking of predicate state.
But I don't want to do that until the predicate state management and
tracing is in reasonably clear state.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49427
llvm-svn: 337446
Summary:
The only thing he suggested that I've skipped here is the double-wide
multiply instructions. Multiply is an area I'm nervous about there being
some hidden data-dependent behavior, and it doesn't seem important for
any benchmarks I have, so skipping it and sticking with the minimal
multiply support that matches what I know is widely used in existing
crypto libraries. We can always add double-wide multiply when we have
clarity from vendors about its behavior and guarantees.
I've tried to at least cover the fundamentals here with tests, although
I've not tried to cover every width or permutation. I can add more tests
where folks think it would be helpful.
Reviewers: craig.topper
Subscribers: sanjoy, mcrosier, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49413
llvm-svn: 337308
invariant instructions to be both more correct and much more powerful.
While testing, I continued to find issues with sinking post-load
hardening. Unfortunately, it was amazingly hard to create any useful
tests of this because we were mostly sinking across copies and other
loading instructions. The fact that we couldn't sink past normal
arithmetic was really a big oversight.
So first, I've ported roughly the same set of instructions from the data
invariant loads to also have their non-loading varieties understood to
be data invariant. I've also added a few instructions that came up so
often it again made testing complicated: inc, dec, and lea.
With this, I was able to shake out a few nasty bugs in the validity
checking. We need to restrict to hardening single-def instructions with
defined registers that match a particular form: GPRs that don't have
a NOREX constraint directly attached to their register class.
The (tiny!) test case included catches all of the issues I was seeing
(once we can sink the hardening at all) except for the NOREX issue. The
only test I have there is horrible. It is large, inexplicable, and
doesn't even produce an error unless you try to emit encodings. I can
keep looking for a way to test it, but I'm out of ideas really.
Thanks to Ben for giving me at least a sanity-check review. I'll follow
up with Craig to go over this more thoroughly post-commit, but without
it SLH crashes everywhere so landing it for now.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49378
llvm-svn: 337177
Found cases that hit the assert I added. This patch factors the validity
checking into a nice helper routine and calls it when deciding to harden
post-load, and asserts it when doing so later.
I've added tests for the various ways of loading a floating point type,
as well as loading all vector permutations. Even though many of these go
to identical instructions, it seems good to somewhat comprehensively
test them.
I'm confident there will be more fixes needed here, I'll try to add
tests each time as I get this predicate adjusted.
llvm-svn: 337160
indices used by AVX2 and AVX-512 gather instructions.
The index vector is hardened by broadcasting the predicate state
into a vector register and then or-ing. We don't even have to worry
about EFLAGS here.
I've added a test for all of the gather intrinsics to make sure that we
don't miss one. A particularly interesting creation is the gather
prefetch, which needs to be marked as potentially "loading" to get the
correct behavior. It's a memory access in many ways, and is actually
relevant for SLH. Based on discussion with Craig in review, I've moved
it to be `mayLoad` and `mayStore` rather than generic side effects. This
matches how we model other prefetch instructions.
Many thanks to Craig for the review here.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49336
llvm-svn: 337144
no conditions.
This is only valid to do if we're hardening calls and rets with LFENCE
which results in an LFENCE guarding the entire entry block for us.
llvm-svn: 337089
Ryzen has something like an 18 cycle latency on these based on Agner's data. AMD's own xls is blank. So it seems like there might be something tricky here.
Agner's data for Intel CPUs indicates these are a single uop there.
Probably safest to remove them. We never generate them without an intrinsic so this should be ok.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49315
llvm-svn: 337067
-Drop the intrinsic versions of conversion instructions. These should be handled when we do vectors. They shouldn't show up in scalar code.
-Add the float<->double conversions which were missing.
-Add the AVX512 and AVX version of the conversion instructions including the unsigned integer conversions unique to AVX512
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49313
llvm-svn: 337066
-Move BSF/BSR to the same group as TZCNT/LZCNT/POPCNT.
-Split some of the bit manipulation instructions away from TZCNT/LZCNT/POPCNT. These are things like 'x & (x - 1)' which are composed of a few simple arithmetic operations. These aren't nearly as complicated/surprising as counting bits.
-Move BEXTR/BZHI into their own group. They aren't like a simple arithmethic op or the bit manipulation instructions. They're more like a shift+and.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49312
llvm-svn: 337065
Spectre variant #1 for x86.
There is a lengthy, detailed RFC thread on llvm-dev which discusses the
high level issues. High level discussion is probably best there.
I've split the design document out of this patch and will land it
separately once I update it to reflect the latest edits and updates to
the Google doc used in the RFC thread.
This patch is really just an initial step. It isn't quite ready for
prime time and is only exposed via debugging flags. It has two major
limitations currently:
1) It only supports x86-64, and only certain ABIs. Many assumptions are
currently hard-coded and need to be factored out of the code here.
2) It doesn't include any options for more fine-grained control, either
of which control flow edges are significant or which loads are
important to be hardened.
3) The code is still quite rough and the testing lighter than I'd like.
However, this is enough for people to begin using. I have had numerous
requests from people to be able to experiment with this patch to
understand the trade-offs it presents and how to use it. We would also
like to encourage work to similar effect in other toolchains.
The ARM folks are actively developing a system based on this for
AArch64. We hope to merge this with their efforts when both are far
enough along. But we also don't want to block making this available on
that effort.
Many thanks to the *numerous* people who helped along the way here. For
this patch in particular, both Eric and Craig did a ton of review to
even have confidence in it as an early, rough cut at this functionality.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D44824
llvm-svn: 336990
Chandler Carruth